August 2, 2019 | Big Machine

You Need To Calm Down

Snakes and Stones Never Broke My Bones
August 2, 2019 | Big Machine

You Need To Calm Down

Snakes and Stones Never Broke My Bones

You are somebody that I don’t know
But you’re takin’ shots at me like it’s Patrón
And I’m just like, damn, it’s 7 AM
Say it in the street, that’s a knock-out
But you say it in a Tweet, that’s a cop-out
And I’m just like, “Hey, are you okay?”
And I ain’t tryna mess with your self-expression
But I’ve learned a lesson that stressin’ and obsessin’ ’bout somebody else is no fun
And snakes and stones never broke my bones
So oh-oh, oh-oh, oh-oh, oh-oh, oh-oh
You need to calm down, you’re being too loud
And I’m just like oh-oh, oh-oh, oh-oh, oh-oh, oh-oh (oh)
You need to just stop
Like can you just not step on my gown?
You need to calm down

Iran, the NPT, and the CSA

Iran signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1970.1 Iran signed a CSA with the IAEA in 1973; the CSA went into force in 1974.2

Between the IAEA’s first visit to Natanz in 2003 and the JCPOA’s finalization in 2015, the IAEA and its Board of Governors repeatedly found Iran in noncompliance with the CSA for failing to declare key nuclear sites, activities, and material. Iran’s misconduct spurred the international community to seek Iran’s adoption of the AP and ultimately the JCPOA, discussed in subsections (2) and (3) below.

Iran’s Nuclear Archive in Shorabad: Implications for the NPT and the CSA
  • Iran’s failure to declare the sites, equipment, and activities identified in the nuclear archive constitutes an apparent violation of the CSA and of the NPT’s Articles II and III.
  • In light of Iran’s other violations of the CSA, as documented by the IAEA in multiple reports between 2003 and 2015, Iran’s omissions raise concerns that undeclared nuclear activity may continue today.
  • In accordance with the IAEA Statute, the IAEA director general is obliged to report any Iranian noncompliance with the CSA – and, by extension, Iran’s noncompliance with the NPT’s Article III – to the Board of Governors, which may then report Iran to the UNSC and the UNGA.
  • Even without action by the IAEA, NPT state parties, including the United States, can exert diplomatic pressure on Tehran by declaring Iran in violation of the NPT’s Article II.

(2) Additional Protocol (AP)

First issued by the IAEA in 1997, the AP “is not a stand-alone agreement,” as the agency puts it,3 but a legally binding addendum to the CSA that parties to the NPT may voluntarily elect to sign. The AP contains strengthened tools to detect and inspect undeclared facilities, materials, and activities. In so doing, the AP fills gaps in the IAEA’s knowledge that may otherwise endure if the agency relied only on a state’s CSA declarations. When a state adopts an AP, the IAEA subsequently regards the state’s CSA and AP as a single document, with the AP simply providing improved methods to implement the CSA’s mandate. Today, the AP has entered into force in 134 countries.4

The AP resulted from the agency’s experience in Iraq, North Korea, and South Africa in the early 1990s, which demonstrated that inspectors lacked significant means to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities in states with CSAs. Thus, notes the IAEA, the AP aims to provide “broader access to information about the State’s nuclear programme, increased physical access by the IAEA and improved administrative arrangements.”5 In IAEA parlance, access provided by a state under an AP, including any relevant information the state provides, is called “complementary access.”6

For states with an AP, the IAEA seeks to reach what it describes as a “broader conclusion that all nuclear material” in the state “remains in peaceful activities.”7 Such a determination typically occurs after a multi-year investigation, at which time the IAEA implements “integrated safeguards.” The agency defines integrated safeguards as “an optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the IAEA” under the CSA and AP aimed at achieving “maximum effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the IAEA’s safeguards obligations within available resources.” In other words, because the agency has “increased assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole, the intensity of inspection activities at declared facilities and LOFS [i.e., locations outside facilities] can be reduced.”8

The IAEA reaches a broader conclusion only for countries that both have signed and have ratified an AP. The agency recertifies the broader conclusion annually.

Ali Akbar Salehi (left), then Iran’s resident representative to the IAEA and currently the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and Mohammad ElBaradei, then the IAEA’s director general, sign the Additional Protocol on December 18, 2003, in Vienna, Austria. (Photo: Dean Calma/IAEA)

Scope of IAEA Inspections under the AP

In states with an AP, the IAEA may continue to request access to any site in the country it deems necessary, including undeclared or military sites. However, in contrast to states that lack an AP, the IAEA need not limit itself to state declarations as the basis of any request for access.

  • You are somebody that we don’t know
  • But you’re comin’ at my friends like a missile
  • Why are you mad?
    When you could be GLAAD? (You could be GLAAD)
    Sunshine on the street at the parade
    But you would rather be in the dark age
    Just makin’ that sign must’ve taken all night
  1. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Iran (Islamic Republic of),” accessed August 5, 2019. (http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/s/iran%28islamicrepublicof%29)
  2. International Atomic Energy Agency, “The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferatio [sic] of Nuclear Weapons,” INFCIRC/214, June 19, 1973. (https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1974/infcirc214.pdf)
  3. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Additional Protocol,” accessed August 5, 2019. (https://www.iaea.org/topics/additional-protocol)
  4. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards,” INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), September 1997. (https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc540c.pdf)
  5. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Additional Protocol,” accessed August 5, 2019. (https://www.iaea.org/topics/additional-protocol)
  6. See: IAEA Safeguards Glossary: 2001 Edition (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002), page 91. (https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/iaea_safeguards_glossary.pdf)
  7. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Additional Protocol,” accessed August 5, 2019. (https://www.iaea.org/topics/additional-protocol)
  8. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Safeguards Statement for 2018,” page 5, accessed August 5, 2019. (https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/06/statement-sir-2018.pdf); see also: Laura Rockwood, Legal Framework for IAEA Safeguards (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2013), pages 29-30. (https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/16/12/legalframeworkforsafeguards.pdf); see: IAEA Safeguards Glossary: 2001 Edition (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002), page 19. (https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/iaea_safeguards_glossary.pdf)
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